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Abstract 
We investigate the role of anonymity, reciprocity, and conformity for voluntary 
contributions, based on a natural field experiment conducted at a national park in Costa 
Rica. Contributions made in public in front of the solicitor are 25% higher than 
contributions made in private. Giving subjects a small gift before requesting a 
contribution increases the likelihood of a positive contribution. At the same time, the 
conditional contribution decreases. The total effect of giving a gift is positive but small, 
and taking the cost of the gift into account, it is far from profitable. When the subjects 
are told that the typical contribution of others is $2 (a small contribution), the 
probability of a contribution increases and the conditional contribution decreases, 
compared with providing no reference information. Providing a high reference level 
($10) increases the conditional contributions. Overall, the total effects have the expected 
signs, although the magnitudes are smaller than what one might have expected based on 
existing evidence from laboratory experiments. 
 
JEL-classification: C93, Q50 
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1. Introduction 
Although a large part of economic theory assumes a narrow definition of selfishness, 
much evidence suggests that people are often not motivated solely by own material 
payoffs. Besides straightforward observations of charity (see Andreoni, 2006 and 
Vesterlund, 2006 for excellent overviews), there is an overwhelming amount of recent 
experimental evidence (see for example Ledyard, 1995 and Camerer, 2003). Moreover, 
unlike the atomistic and amoral Homo Economicus, people often do not act 
independently of private and social norms. Most of us consider it important to be 
regarded positively by others (Brennan and Pettit, 2004; Kuran, 1995), but we also seem 
to prefer to have a positive view of ourselves independent of the view of others (Akerlof 
and Kranton, 2000; Benabou and Tirole, 2002, 2006; Santos-Pinto and Sobel 2005). As 
expressed by Adam Smith (1759): “The most sincere praise can give little pleasure 
when it cannot be considered as some sort of proof of praise-worthiness.” However, 
clear empirical evidence outside the lab of what influences altruistic or charitable 
behavior is still scarce. Using the terminology of Harrison and List (2004), this paper 
presents the results of a natural field experiment in Costa Rica, where the importance of 
anonymity, reciprocity, and conformity for people’s voluntary contributions to a 
national park are investigated. 
 Laboratory experiments have many advantages, in particular with respect to the 
possibility of holding other possible influences than the one under investigation fixed. 
Levitt and List (2006) argue that lab experiments therefore are useful in generating 
qualitative insights. Obviously, laboratory experiments also have drawbacks. Levitt and 
List (2006) argue that one needs to be very careful when generalizing quantitative 
findings outside the lab environment. They conclude that laboratory experiments and 
data generated in the field are complements rather than substitutes. We concur with this 
view.  
 In broad terms, several potential reasons for non-selfish behavior have been 
identified in the experimental literature, including the following: (i) People prefer to 
conform to what others do. Thus, people behave more unselfishly if they observe that 
others act unselfishly. (ii) People reciprocate; that is, if others have been nice to you, 
you tend to be nice to them. (iii) People are motivated both by their own view of 
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themselves as well as by how other people view them. This implies that people tend to 
act less altruistically if no one observes their actions.  
The purpose of this paper is to test the absolute as well as the relative importance 
of these three reasons for non-selfish behavior. This is done by conducting a natural 
field experiment on voluntary contributions to a national park in Costa Rica, where 
international tourists were asked if they would like to contribute to the park. The effect 
of anonymity is tested by letting the subjects contribute their money either openly in the 
presence of the solicitor, or in a sealed envelope. The effect of reciprocity is 
investigated by handing over a small gift (a refrigerator magnet) to a sub-sample of 
subjects, prior to their contribution decision. With reciprocity we mean that people are 
reciprocal if they reward kind actions and punish unkind actions towards them; cf. Falk 
and Fischbacher (2006) and Rabin (1993). In principle, the kindness of the action can be 
evaluated both in terms of the consequences and in terms of intentions (Dufwenberg and 
Kirchsteiger, 2004; Rabin, 1993); simply put, kind actions appreciated for their good 
consequences can trigger punishing behavior if the intentions are regarded as bad. We 
investigate the effect of conformity by providing the subjects with information about the 
contributions of previous subjects. The information is varied among subjects and we 
include the case of providing no information as well. By conformity we mean that 
people care about their own contribution relative to the contributions of others; see 
Bernheim (1994) for an example of a model of conformity where people care about 
their status in terms of their relative contribution to a public good. 
 An attractive feature of our design is that it allows us to separate reciprocity from 
conformity, which is not possible in most studies of conditional cooperation.1 For 
example, if people contribute more when others contribute more in public good games, 
this may in part reflect reciprocity and in part conformity.  
Just looking at the raw data, our findings can be summarized as follows: 
Anonymity decreases contributions by about 25%. Giving a small gift (reciprocity) 
increases contributions by about 5%. However, this effect is not at all sufficient to cover 
the cost of the gift given to the subjects. A reference level of $10 increases contributions 
by about 4% compared with not providing any reference contribution information. 
However, providing a lower reference level of $2 decreases contributions by 23% 
                                                 
1 A notable exception is Bardsley and Sausgruber (2005). 
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compared to the baseline of no reference level. The effects of anonymity, reciprocity, 
and providing social reference points are similar in a regression analysis. There are also 
some interesting asymmetric effects on the probability of contributing anything at all 
and on the contribution conditional on a positive contribution: In the reciprocity 
treatment more people contribute, while the average conditional contribution is lower. 
Increasing the reference level decreases the probability of a positive contribution, but 
increases the conditional contribution.  
The reminder of this paper is organized as follow: Section 2 provides a brief 
literature review of earlier studies with an emphasis on field experiments, Section 3 
presents our theoretical model, Section 4 the field-experimental design, Section 5 the 
corresponding results, while Section 6 concludes the paper.    
 
2. Previous studies 
There are several public good laboratory experiments that look at the role of anonymity; 
see e.g. Andreoni and Petrie (2004), Bohnet and Frey (1999), Laury et al. (1995), 
Masclet et al. (2003), and Rege and Telle (2004). For example, Rege and Telle (2004) 
considered a standard public good game with ten subjects in each group. In one sub-
sample the subjects had to reveal their contribution to the whole group after making the 
contribution decision. The average contribution almost doubled with public 
observability. Andreoni and Petrie (2004) find that giving information about both the 
identity and the contribution of others increases contributions significantly in a public 
good experiment. Interestingly, a treatment where subjects had the option to remain 
anonymous resulted in the highest level of contributions. List et al. (2004) analyzed 
charitable contributions to a Center for Environmental Policy Analysis at the University 
of Central Florida. They used three different information treatments: (i) completely 
anonymous responses, (ii) the experimenter knows the response, and (iii) the whole 
group knows the response. The largest share of yes responses was obtained when the 
whole group was informed of the response, followed by the case when only the 
experimenter knew the response. We have only found one field experiment 
investigating the role of anonymity. Soetevent (2005) investigated the role of anonymity  
in Dutch churches using closed and open collection bags. The use of open baskets, 
where close neighbors in the church could identify a donor’s contribution, increased 
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overall contributions by about 10% in the second offering of the services. 
 There is much evidence from laboratory experiments consistent with reciprocity; 
see for example Fehr and Gächter (2000), Hoffman et al. (1996) and Roth (1995). 
Cialdini (2001) provides a number of real world examples from fund raising to politics 
where the principle of reciprocity plays an important role. Falk (2007) is the only field 
experiment we are aware of that studies reciprocity directly, i.e. how people respond to 
someone after a gift has been given to them. He found a strong and significant effect of 
including a gift with the donation letter; participation increased by 2 percentage points if 
a small gift (1 post card) was included and by 9 percentage points if a large gift (four 
post cards) was included.2  
Many experimental results can be interpreted in terms of conditional cooperation. 
Some public good studies can be questioned based on unclear causality, since 
contributions may affect the expectation of others’ contributions rather than the other 
way around. However, Fischbacher et al. (2001) provide clear evidence based on the 
strategy method: They found that about 50% of the subjects increase their contribution 
in a one-shot public good game if others do so as well. This is also consistent with field 
evidence of Andreoni and Scholz (1998), who, based on a consumer expenditure 
survey, found that donors respond positively to an increase in contributions by others in 
their reference group, which was defined in terms of socioeconomic variables. Bohnet 
and Zeckhauser (2004) found that informing respondents about the average offer in an 
ultimatum bargaining game significantly increases offers and offer-specific rejection 
probabilities. Potters et al. (2005) find that sequential moves in a public good game 
results in a larger provision of the good, because the follower mimics the action of the 
leader. Bardsley and Sausgruber (2005) use an innovative design of a public-good game 
that allows them to distinguish between reciprocity and conformity. They find that 
conformity account for around one third of the increase in contributions due to an 
increase in others contributions. 
 We are aware of four field experiments that analyze the effect of conformity or 
conditional cooperation. Frey and Meier (2004) analyzed the behavior of students in 
Zurich who had the opportunity to contribute to two social funds every semester. The 
                                                 
2 The motives of the postcards were painted by kids together with the text, “Our benefits lie in children’s 
smiles.” One may imagine that they were much more effective than what most other motives would have 
been. 
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contributions were higher when they were informed that many other students were 
contributing, although the effect was not statistically significant. Shang and Croson 
(2006) investigated how information about a typical contribution to a radio station 
affects subject contributions. They found that the highest reference amount ($300) gives 
a significantly higher contribution than giving no information at all. The direction for 
smaller amounts ($75 and $180) was the same, although not statistically significant. 
Heldt (2005) found that Swedish cross-country skiers were more likely to contribute to 
the track maintenance if many others contributed. Martin and Randal (2005) found that 
visitors to a museum put more money into a transparent box, thereby donating money to 
the museum, when there was money in the box compared to when the box was empty. 
 
3. The Model 
Consider a simple model where people care about their own income Y, the public good 
G (the national park in this case), their identity, I, and the social approval, S. Thus, as in 
the models by Brekke et al. (2003) and Johansson-Stenman and Martinsson (2006) they 
want to see themselves as generous and socially responsible persons,3 and as in for 
example Ellingsen and Johannesson (2007) they want others to see them as generous 
and socially responsible persons too. Then we have:4
 G I SU Y G I Sα α α= + + + ,         (1) 
where we assume that , , 0G I Sα α α > , and that 1Gα <  so that the marginal utility of 
private income is larger than the marginal utility of money given to the public good (for 
a constant level of identity and social approval). Private income is given by initial 
income minus the contribution D: 0Y
  .           (2) 0Y Y D= −
Similarly, the amount provided of the public good is given by own contribution, D, plus 
the level before the contribution, , so that 0G
 .           (3) 0G G D= +
                                                 
3 Thus, the way we model identity here can be seen as an extension of the warm-glow theory by Andreoni 
(1989, 1990). For broad discussion of how identity can be incorporated into economics, see Akerlof and 
Kranton (2000). 
4 For our purpose it is sufficient to interpret U in an ordinal way, meaning for example that the linearity in 
income in (1) has no meaning. Moreover, we are only concerned with small changes of Y and G, which 
further motivates the simple functional form chosen.  
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We assume that people may want to see themselves as generous to a good cause per se, 
and also that they would like to fulfil two different norms: a conformity norm and a 
reciprocity norm. The conformity norm stipulates that people would like to give equally 
much as do others on average in a similar situation, . The reciprocity norm, on the 
other hand, implies that if people have received a gift with a value V (from the park 
authorities in our case), they would like to exactly reciprocate this gift (in our case with 
a contribution to the park authorities). Consequently, we assume that individuals face a 
disutility from deviating from these norms.
Dˆ
5 We can then write a persons identity or 
self-image as: 
   ( ) (2 20 ˆUA C R )I I D D D D Vβ β β= + − − − − ,      (4) 
where 0I  is the person’s initial identity before the potential contribution situation, and 
where , 0C Rβ β >  reflect the weights given to the conformity and reciprocity norms, 
respectively. If 0UAβ > then the person’s identity would increase as a result of an 
unconditionally altruistic contribution. Note that when ˆ 0D V= =  it follows that I is 
maximized when 0.5 ( )UA C RD β β β= +
0
, which is clearly positive when 
, ,UA C Rβ β β > . Thus, the individual’s identity is increasing in own contributions even 
when others are not contributing and when there is no gift, provided that 0UAβ > .  
The social approval of an individual is related to the identity as well, and as in 
Andreoni and Bernheim (2007) people want to be perceived as fair.6 For simplicity, we 
assume that the change in social approval depends on the same underlying variables as 
identity. The only difference being that the change in social approval also depends on 
the degree of anonymity, a, of the action. Thus, when identity increases by IΔ , social 
approval increases by  (1  where )a I− Δ 0 a 1≤ ≤ . The social approval of an individual is 
then given by:  
                                                 
5 Here we do not model explicitly why conformity and reciprocity contributes to a positive identity and 
social approval; this is simply assumed based on a large psychological literature. Bernheim (1994) 
provides a model explaining why it may be rational for an individual to conform. Gintis et al. (2005) 
provides a good overview of evolutionary reasons behind reciprocal and other kinds of non-selfish 
behavior. 
6 The concern for social approval can in part be interpreted as a concern for status; see Vesterlund (2006) 
for a discussion on the status motive in charity. 
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 ,   (5) ( ) ( )
0 0
2 20
(1 )( )
ˆ(1 ) (1 ) (1 )UA C R
S S a I I
S a D a D D a D Vβ β β
= + − −
= + − − − − − − −
where  is the initial social approval. Thus, in the case of complete anonymity, 0S 1a = , 
social approval does not change at all when the contribution change. Substituting (2)-(5) 
into (1) we obtain 
 ( ) ( ) ( )( )2 20 ˆ(1 ) (1 )G I S UA C RU U D a D D D D Vα α α β β β= − − + + − − − − −   (6) 
where  is the initial utility level. Assuming an interior 
optimum, we can then solve for an optimal contribution level : 
0 0 0 0
G I SU Y G I Sα α α≡ + + + 0
*D
 * 11ˆ
2( ) 2( ) (1 )
UA C GR
C R C R C R C R I
D D V
a S
β β αβ
β β β β β β β β α α
−= + + −+ + + + + − , (7) 
so that 
*
ˆ
C
C R
D
D
β
β β
∂ = +∂ , 
*
R
C R
D
V
β
β β
∂ =∂ +  and 
*
2
1
2( ) ( (1 ) )
S G
C R I S
D
a a
α α
β β α α
∂ −= −∂ + + − . 
Consequently, since all involved parameters are assumed to be positive, the model 
suggests the testable hypotheses that the contribution will increase with the reference 
level of others’ contributions, , and with the value of a potential received gift, V ,, and 
decrease with the degree of anonymity a (the latter since
Dˆ
1Gα < ). Moreover, for the 
special case when  the model predicts that  if ˆ 0D V= = * 0D > 21( (1
G
a) )UA I S
αβ −= + −α α . 
Thus, a positive contribution is predicted even when others are not expected to 
contribute and when there is no gift to reciprocate, if the parameter that transforms 
unconditionally altruistic contributions to identity, UAβ , is sufficiently large.  
 
4. Design of field experiment 
The natural field experiment concerns contributions of visiting international tourists to 
the Poas National Park (PNP) in Costa Rica in 2006. Much effort was spent on ensuring 
that the situation was realistic and credible, and there was nothing indicating that this 
was a university study with the aim of analyzing people’s behavior. This is potentially 
very important since, as noted by Levitt and List (2006), a perceived experimental 
situation may highlight people’s sense of identity or self-image to a larger extent than 
outside the experimental situation; cf. Akerlof and Kranton (2000).  
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Our five solicitors were officially registered interviewers of the Costa Rican 
Tourism Board. We initially sent invitations via email inviting them to a first screening 
meeting where we evaluated their personalities and abilities to speak fluently in both 
Spanish and English. Out of ten potential solicitors interviewed, we chose five who 
fulfilled all our requirements. The five solicitors participated randomly in all parts of the 
experiment, except for one person who could not participate in the reciprocity 
treatments; in the regression analysis we therefore control for solicitor effects. The 
solicitors underwent extensive, paid training sessions both in the classroom and in the 
field. Once they were ready to start, we dedicated a whole week to testing their 
performance and to making small adjustments in the survey instrument. In addition, 
there were daily debriefing questions and regular meetings with the whole team to make 
sure that all solicitors were using the exact wording of the scenarios.  
 Solicitors approached international tourists right after they had visited the volcano 
crater, which is the main attraction of the park, and before they entered the visitor’s 
center. They were approached at an “interview station” decorated with the logos of the 
PNP, the National System of Protected Areas (SINAC), and CATIE,7 in the area outside 
the restaurant and souvenir shop. The solicitors wore uniforms with the logos of the 
PNP and CATIE plus formal identification cards that included a photo and signatures of 
the park authorities. The uniforms were very similar to those used by the park rangers at 
PNP. A formal letter authorizing the collection of contributions was also clearly visible.  
 Only international tourists who could speak either Spanish or English participated 
in the experiment. The subjects were approached randomly, with the exception that two 
people in the same group of visitors were never approached. The selection was one of 
the key elements of the training sessions, and we checked for biases in the selection of 
subjects daily. No corrections were required after the pilot sessions. 
Initially, subjects were asked if they were willing to participate in an interview 
about their visit to the PNP. No mention of voluntary contributions took place at this 
stage, so we expect that participation was not affected by monetary considerations. 
Overall participation rates were very high (above 85% each day). Once we established 
that they were international tourist and that they had already visited the crater, the 
solicitors proceeded with the interview. Since all interviews took place in private in the 
                                                 
7 Spanish acronym for the Tropical Agricultural Research and Higher Education Center, which had the 
main responsibility for data collection. 
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interview station, other potential participants could not observe the behavior of the 
interviewed person (an exception being if they refused to participate in the interview). 
Before the actual experiment, subjects were asked a few questions regarding their visit 
to Costa Rica and to the national park. The solicitors were provided with standardized 
replies to the most common questions regarding the survey, the experiment, the 
institutions involved, etc. For further information the participants were advised to talk to 
the main supervisor of the contribution campaign. 
The experiment involved three different treatments: (1) An examination of the 
role of anonymity for individual contributions, (2) an exploration of the effect of giving 
a small gift before asking for a contribution to the national park, and (3) a study on the 
effect of providing a changing social reference point on individual contributions. Each 
treatment required slight modifications of the interviewing script, but we were very 
careful in limiting the differences among the treatments. Subjects also received a card 
where they could read the scenario and the instructions for the voluntary contribution. 
The actual experiment began with the following sentence: 
 
“I will now read to you some information about the funding of national parks in 
Costa Rica. Here is a paper with the information I will read.”  
 
In the reciprocity treatment, the solicitor then gave the gift to the participant and said: 
 
“Also, this is a little gift in appreciation of your time.” 
 
The treatments without reciprocity simply did not include any gift or the associated 
information. The gift was a colorful, handcrafted refrigerator magnet, depicting the 
main attractions of the PNP: the lagoon, the crater, and the forest. The retail value of the 
gift is $3 and its cost for the park administration is approximately $1.50. Since the 
participants were approached right after visiting the park and before they entered the 
visitor’s center, they had no explicit knowledge about the exact value of the gift.8 
Moreover, in order to avoid confusion and cross contamination between the treatments 
                                                 
8 For this reason we do not believe that the donations are largely influenced by anchoring, in the sense 
that people for purely cognitive reasons choose to donate the same (or a similar) amount as the price of 
the gift; cf. Tversky and Kahneman (1974). 
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with and without gifts, these were done sequentially. After this, the participants were 
told about the main purpose of the request for a contribution: 
 
“The System of National Parks in Costa Rica is now suffering from the lack of 
funds to achieve a good management of the parks, both for biodiversity 
conservation and tourism. Available funds are simply not enough and national 
parks are trying to obtain new funds. We are now testing a system at Poas 
National Park where visitors can make donations to the park. The entrance fee 
remains the same seven dollars, but people have the possibility to make voluntary 
donations to the park in addition to the fee. Contributions will be used to improve 
the standard of living of park rangers, to provide for better trails and to make 
sure that this beautiful and unique ecosystem is well taken care of.” 
 
The effect of a social reference point is analyzed through providing the subjects with 
information about a typical previous contribution of others. If a reference point was 
provided, the following sentence was read:  
 
“We have interviewed tourists from many different countries and one of the most 
common donations has been 2 / 5 / 10 US dollars.” 
 
The monetary reference values used were obtained from a pilot study conducted at the 
same park right before the main experiment. In the treatments with no mentioned 
reference amount, the above sentence was simply omitted.  
 Finally, the actual request for a contribution differed depending on whether the 
contribution was to be anonymous or not. In the anonymous case, subjects were asked 
to go into a private area that was part of our interviewing station and put their 
contribution, if any, in a sealed envelope and into a small ballot box, making the 
contribution completely anonymous to the solicitor.9 In this case, the following text was 
read: 
                                                 
9 In order for us to identify the contributions and link them to the questions in the questionnaire, an ID 
number was written on the envelope. The subjects were informed about the ID number and the reason for 
using it. The important point here is that the solicitors were not able to observe the contributions, not even 
afterwards.  
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 “How much are you willing to donate to this fund? Please go to the booth and put 
the amount of money you would like to donate in the envelope.  Remember that 
donations will be used exclusively to maintain and improve the Poas National 
Park, as described before. When you are done, please seal the envelope and put it 
in this box.  Do not show it to me, because your donation should be completely 
anonymous. Please put the envelope in the box even if you do not wish to donate 
anything.” 
 
We provided a locked ballot box in which the contributions were put. This box was 
actually part of the interviewing station where the subject and the solicitor would sit for 
the experimental session. In the non-anonymous setting, the following text was read: 
 
“How much are you willing to donate to this fund? Remember that donations will 
be used exclusively to maintain and improve the Poas National Park, as described 
before. When you are done reading, please give the envelope and your 
contribution to me so that I can count and register your donation before sealing 
the envelope. Please return the envelope even if you do not wish to donate 
anything.” 
 
Thus, in this treatment the subjects were well aware that the solicitor was observing 
each contribution.  
Table 1 summarizes the experimental design for all three treatments. In total 997 
subjects participated in the experiment. The different treatments were conducted at the 
same time, and they were randomly distributed both in terms of the order during the day 
and among solicitors. The only exception is that we, for practical reasons, did not 
conduct interviews with and without gifts at the same time.   
<<Table 1 about here>> 
Besides the differences described above, everything else was identical in all interviews 
and the typical variations of a field experiment (weather, type of tourist, etc) are 
expected to randomly affect our results.  
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5. Results 
Table 2 presents the basic results from the field experiments. As can be observed, in 
total 52% of the subjects chose to contribute and the average contribution was $2.49 for 
the whole sample. In total 997 subjects were approached and we raised $2,775. 
<<Table 2 about here>> 
The distribution of the contributions is skewed, with a large fraction of zeros and a few 
very large contributions; the largest contribution was $100. The first histogram in 
Figure 1 shows the distribution of conditional contributions for the whole experiment. 
Note that the rightmost bar is contributions larger than $10.  
<<Figure 1 about here>>  
We also present the results from a regression analysis. As argued by Botelho et al. 
(2005), it is important to correct for possible differences when using subjects who 
typically have a larger variation in terms of socio-economic characteristics than students 
have. Another advantage of the regression analysis is that it allows us to handle extreme 
responses in a systematic way. 
The dependent variable, contributions, is censored since it equals zero for a 
substantial fraction of the subjects. In addition, there are two issues of interest here: 
whether to contribute anything at all and how much to contribute, given a positive 
contribution. Since there are good reasons to consider these as two different decisions, a 
basic Tobit model would be inappropriate. Here we will therefore instead use a simple 
two-stage model. The decision whether to contribute anything or not is modeled with a 
standard probit model. The decision concerning how much to contribute, given a 
positive contribution, is modeled with a regression model using only subjects with a 
positive contribution.10 However, the contribution distribution is skewed due to a few 
outliers. A standard ordinary least squares model would therefore put an inappropriately 
large weight on the outliers. In order to deal with this problem we apply a robust 
regression.11  
                                                 
10 We also estimated a sample selection model allowing for a correlation between the probit and the 
regression models. However, we could never reject the hypothesis of no sample selection. 
11 We use the rreg command in STATA. First a standard regression is estimated, and observations with a 
Cook’s distance larger than one are excluded. In our case 19 observations are excluded. After that, the 
model is estimated iteratively: it performs a regression, calculate weights based on absolute residuals, and 
regresses again using those weights (STATA, 2005). See Rousseeuw and Leroy (1987) for a description 
of the robust regression model.  
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 The base case in the regression models is the anonymous treatment without 
reciprocity and no mention of a reference contribution. Table 3 presents the marginal 
effects for the two estimated models together with the total marginal effect, i.e. 
including the effects of the probit stage; all marginal effects are calculated at sample 
means.12 The total marginal effect is calculated as 
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]00|0|0 >∂
>∂+>∂
>∂=∂
∂
i
i
ii
ii
i
i
i
i CP
x
CCECCE
x
CP
x
CE  , 
where  is the expected contribution of individual i, [ iCE ] [ ]0>iCP  is the probability 
that individual i contributes anything at all, and  is a covariate. Both the probit model 
and the regression models include a constant, solicitor dummy variables, and a few 
individual socio-economic characteristics.
ix
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<<Table 3 about here>> 
 
Anonymity 
From Table 2 we see that the share of subjects contributing is higher in the non-
anonymous treatment, but using the chi-square test of equal proportions contributing we 
cannot reject the hypothesis of equal proportions (p = 0.433). The average contribution 
is 25% higher compared with the anonymous treatment, but using the non-parameteric 
Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test of equal underlying contribution distributions for the two 
treatments, we cannot reject the hypothesis of equal distributions (p = 0.166). We do 
find that the average conditional contribution is 19% higher in the non-anonymous 
treatment and using the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test we can reject the hypothesis of 
                                                 
12 For the probit model the marginal effect for dummy variables is for a discrete change of the variable 
from zero to one.  
13 The individual characteristics included in the regressions are gender and age of the subjects, whether 
they are members of an environmental organization, whether they saw the volcano, a dummy variable for 
US subjects, and a dummy variable for European subjects. Among other things, we find that male 
subjects are more likely to contribute, but that there is no difference in the conditional contribution. One 
explanation for this could be that four of our five solicitors were females. As shown by Landry et al. 
(2006), contributions are positively correlated with the physical attractiveness of female solicitors for 
male contributors. Among the five solicitors, one female solicitor has a larger proportion of subjects 
contributing. This solicitor also has a higher conditional contribution. We also find that older subjects are 
more likely to contribute and that they on average contribute more, possibly indicating that there is a 
positive relationship between age and non-selfish preferences; cf. List (2004). However, since we cannot 
accurately control for income, another possible reason is simply that older people have higher income. 
We also find that members of an environmental organization are more likely to contribute, but on average 
they do not contribute more. Finally, we tested for differences among subjects from Europe, the US, and 
South America, without finding any statistically significant differences. 
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equal distributions (p = 0.09). The results can be compared to List et al. (2004) who 
found that the proportion of subjects voting in favor of a proposal of financing a public 
good is significantly lower in a treatment where subjects are completely anonymous 
(20%) compared with a treatment where the solicitor observes the behavior (38%).  
However, if we then look at the results of the regression models we see that 
anonymity only plays a role in the reciprocity treatment. In the models with interaction 
effects, the dummy variable for the non-anonymous treatment is insignificant. However, 
the parameter associated with the interaction variable between the non-anonymous and 
the reciprocity treatments is significant in both the probit model and the robust 
regression.14 Thus, in the case of reciprocity, non-anonymity increases the probability 
of contributing but decreases the conditional contribution. This difference between 
reciprocity and no-reciprocity treatments is also confirmed using the Wilcoxon-Mann-
Whitney test; it is only for the reciprocity treatments that there is a significant difference 
in contribution distributions between the anonymous and non-anonymous treatments. 
 
Reciprocity 
Comparing the treatments with and without reciprocity in Table 2, we see that the share 
of subjects contributing a positive amount is 8 percentage points higher in the 
reciprocity treatment. However, the conditional average contribution is smaller in the 
treatment with reciprocity. One possible explanation is that more subjects with a low 
willingness to contribute decide to contribute, while the contribution of those who 
would give without a gift is relatively unaffected. Still, the effect on the share of subject 
contributing dominates, resulting in a slightly higher average sample contribution. The 
average contribution in the whole sample is a little bit more than 5 percentage points 
higher in the reciprocity treatment. All these effects are significant: Using the 
Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test we can reject the hypothesis of equal distributions both 
for the conditional sample (p = 0.040) and for the whole sample (p = 0.096); and using 
the chi-square test of equal proportions contributing we can also reject the hypothesis of 
equal proportions (p = 0.007). The total effect of reciprocity is an increase in average 
contributions by $0.13. This can be compared with the cost of the gift of $1.50. Thus, 
                                                 
14 The reason why the regression results show a lower conditional contribution for the non-anonymous 
treatment, while the descriptive results show the opposite is that a few outliers affect the average 
conditional contribution. 
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not considering any other effects, giving a gift before subjects are asked to contribute is 
far from profitable. This is consistent with the casual observations that most 
organizations that raise money in similar ways do not use gifts to invoke reciprocity.15 
An exception sometimes mentioned is Hare Krishna. According to Cialdini (2001), their 
strategy of handing over a small gift such as a book or a flower was initially very 
successful in invoking reciprocity and thus increasing contributions. However, over 
time this strategy became less efficient when people became aware that this was in fact 
just a strategy to raise more money. We believe that this points to something 
fundamentally important that also concerns the results in our experiment, namely that 
not only the consequences of an action matter, but also the intentions (cf. Dufwenberg 
and Kirchsteiger, 2004; Rabin, 1993). In our case, a reason for the somewhat small 
degree of reciprocity may well be that many subjects felt that the intention of giving the 
gift was to increase contributions.  
The regression analysis reveals that giving a small gift to the subject increases the 
probability that the subject contributes anything at all by around 10 percentage points. 
At the same time, the average conditional contribution is around $0.80 lower when the 
contribution is anonymous. The net effect is quite small and insignificant. When we 
interact anonymity with reciprocity, we can see that basically all of the probability 
effect is obtained in the non-anonymous treatment, and that this effect is more or less 
completely off-set by a decrease in conditional contribution. Thus, it seems that the 
effects of reciprocity are much larger in a non-anonymous context, which is also 
intuitively reasonable.    
 
Conformity 
For reference contributions, we can make a number of comparisons. Compared with not 
giving any information about other people’s contributions, it can be observed from 
Table 2 that the share of subjects contributing is higher if a $2 reference contribution is 
communicated, and the difference is significant (p = 0.002). However, while the 
average contribution and the conditional average contribution are lower, it is only the 
difference in distribution for the latter that is significant (p = 0.001). If we then compare 
                                                 
15 There could of course be other positive effects of giving a small gift, either before or after a 
contribution. Subjects may feel more attached to the organization and may support it in other instances. It 
can also result in increased contributions over time.  
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the different treatments with a reference contribution, the share of subjects contributing 
decreases as the reference level increases, although the difference in shares between $5 
and $10 is not significant. At the same time, the average conditional contribution 
increases, and the difference in the distributions is significant in all cases. To gain 
additional insights on the differences among the treatments, Figure 1 presents 
histograms for the conditional contribution for all treatments; the rightmost bar is again 
contributions greater than $10. One clear difference is that the $2 reference contribution 
results in fewer larger contributions. As expected, the most common contribution is $2 
if a reference point of $2 is given. Similarly, $5 is the most common if a $5 reference is 
given, and $10 is the most common if a $10 reference is given. 
The results from the regression analysis largely confirm the results from the non-
parametric analysis. The likelihood of contributing anything at all is significantly higher 
in the $2 reference contribution treatment compared with all other treatments. At the 
same time, the average conditional contribution decreases by $1.10 compared to the 
treatment without a reference contribution; these two opposite effects results in an 
insignificant total effect. Since the total effect is insignificant, some of those who would 
have contributed anyway ended up contributing less than without the reference 
contribution. This may be because subjects without any information tended to believe 
that a typical contribution is higher than $2, which is correct since according to Table 1 
others contributed on average around $5 in the no treatment case. This new knowledge 
creates two effects. On the one hand, when faced with a typical average contribution of 
only $2, those who would have contributed anyway responded by on average lowering 
their contributions. On the other hand, the other subjects realized that it is rather cheap 
to adhere to the typical practice and hence agreed to a positive contribution. In this way 
the result is an increased participation but lower conditional contributions.  
 The $10 reference contribution results in an average conditional contribution that 
is around $0.70 higher compared with not giving any reference information. The total 
effect is almost $0.50; thus, presenting a $10 reference contribution increases average 
contributions by 50 cents compared with not giving any information at all.16 This 
difference is somewhat larger than what the simple comparison between average 
contributions revealed in Table 2.  
                                                 
16 The effect compared with for example a $2 reference contribution is of course even larger. 
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 In order to compare our results with Shang and Croson (2006), we need to focus 
on average conditional contributions since, by the nature of their experiment, they were 
able to look only at positive contributions. If we take the average conditional 
contribution for the no reference treatment ($6) as given, providing a reference 
contribution of $10 results in an increase of almost 12%. This can be compared with 
Shang and Croson (2006) who also found an increase in contributions for their highest 
reference contribution. However, they found increasing conditional contributions for 
reference contributions that were below the average contribution in the baseline case as 
well, whereas we find negative or insignificant effects for our two such reference levels 
(i.e. the $2 and $5 reference treatments, respectively). 
It is also interesting to test whether the social reference contribution has a stronger 
effect if it is expressed in the same currency as the subjects are used to. The reference 
contributions were expressed solely in US dollars, but the subjects were free to 
contribute in any currency, and some subjects actually contributed in several currencies; 
51%, contributed only in dollars and 45% contributed only in colones.17 To test if the 
behavior differed between these two groups we estimate an additional robust regression 
for the conditional contribution. This regression includes a dummy variable equal to one 
if the contribution was made only in dollars. This dummy variable is also interacted 
with the reference contribution dummy variables. The results of the regression are 
reported in the last two columns of Table 3. Most importantly, we find that people who 
contributed in dollars are the subjects who “react” to the $10 reference contribution. 
Thus, our result that a $10 reference contribution results in a large average contribution 
is driven by this sub-sample. We do not find any significant interaction effect for the 
other reference levels. A possible explanation is that a subject who contributes in a 
currency other than dollars has to calculate how much the reference contribution is 
worth in that currency. A subject will therefore face the choice of whether it is 
worthwhile undertaking this calculation exercise. Suppose that the subject has a very 
rough perception of the order of magnitude of the reference amount. If the reference 
level is a low amount, the subject knows that others have contributed a rather small 
                                                 
17 $1 = 500 Costa Rican Colones. Note that only international tourists participated in the experiment. 57% 
of those who contributed only in dollars and 53% of those who contributed only in colones were 
Americans. There is no significant difference with respect to gender or age between these two groups. 
Finally, those who only contributed in dollars, contributed on average $1.10 more than the other subjects.  
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amount. He may then be tempted to calculate exactly how much others have 
contributed, since such information would not be potentially damaging for his self-
image. If, on the other hand, others have contributed a lot, such as $10, an exact 
calculation of how much this corresponds to would make the reference level more 
salient, which in turn might be damaging for the subject’s self image since it would 
likely mean that he himself is willing to contribute less than others. Alternatively, 
saving his self image would be expensive to him. Such an explanation is consistent with 
much psychological evidence, suggesting that people often interpret external evidence 
in a self-serving way (Baumeister, 2000). For example, people discover flaws in 
evidence easier when they are portrayed in an unflattering light than when they are 
portrayed in a good light (Pyszczynski, Greenberg and Holt, 1985), and people typically 
spend less time to process critical compared to positive feedback (Baumeister and 
Cairns, 1992).  
  
6. Conclusions 
Using a natural field experiment, we have quantified the importance of anonymity, 
reciprocity, and conformity through the provision of social reference levels in order to 
explain voluntary contributions to a national park in Costa Rica. All total effects of the 
various treatments have the expected signs.  
Anonymity decreases contributions, even if this effect is not statistically significant. 
Contributions in front of the solicitor are on average 25% larger than contributions 
made in private. That the difference is not larger suggests that identity effects of being a 
generous or socially responsible person, irrespective of other people’s opinions or social 
approval, is an important explanation of contribution behavior. We also found that the 
reciprocity treatment induces more people to contribute, while decreasing the average 
conditional contribution. Something similar applies for the comparison between 
providing no reference information and providing a reference of $2. These two 
treatments seem to “force” contributions from subjects who would not otherwise 
contribute, but in line with their baseline preferences, they tend to contribute less than 
others. The net effect of providing a reference amount of a magnitude similar to the 
mean contribution in the base case (with no reference contribution) has virtually no 
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effect on the conditional contribution. Providing a smaller or larger reference amount 
decreases and increases the size of the contribution, respectively.  
The overall effects are perhaps smaller than expected, compared with findings from 
laboratory experiments. There are several possible explanations to this. One is that 
decisions in the laboratory to a larger extent than real world decisions may influence 
people in asking themselves “what type of person am I?” for the simple reason that they 
know that they are participating in an experiment and are being observed. Consequently, 
subjects may be affected more by different treatments in a lab environment. Another 
explanation is that field experiments concern earned wealth, while many laboratory 
experiments involve wind-fall money. In fact, Cherry et al. (2002) find that in a lab 
experiment, earned endowments substantially reduce offers in dictator games. A third 
potential explanation is that the social distance to the solicitor and the other 
subjects/visitors is larger in the field than in the lab. Although it is an important step to 
move outside the lab, the findings can of course not be generalized to all possible real-
life situations. For example, the importance of being perceived by others as generous, 
and perhaps committed to a good cause, may depend on who is observing one’s 
behavior. The solicitor is presumably not that important for the subjects, and it is only 
one person. Hence, one may expect anonymity to be much more important in other 
contexts. Similarly, the effects of reciprocity may of course depend on the particular gift 
given, and also on the perceived intention behind the gift. 
 There are several interesting areas for future research. For example, what is the 
influence of the type of gift, and of who gives? Does the willingness to conform depend 
on the social distance so that subjects are more willing to conform to other subjects 
from the same country or of the same gender? And what is the effect on behavior of 
making their contribution known to more people by for example giving contributors a 
small badge saying that they are supporters of the park? We leave these and other 
extensions to future research.   
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Table 1. Experimental design for all treatment combinations. 
 
 No reciprocity Reciprocity Total 
 Anonymous Non-anonymous Anonymous Non-anonymous  
No reference donation 62 observations 63 observations 62 observations 63 observations 250 
Reference donation: $2 61 observations 63 observations 62 observations 63 observations 249 
Reference donation: $5 62 observations 62 observations 62 observations 63 observations 249 
Reference donation: $10 62 observations 62 observations 62 observations 63 observations 249 
Total  247 observations 250 observations 248 observations 252 observations 997 
 
Table 2. Descriptive field-experimental results. 
 
 
 
Observa-
tions 
Share pos. 
contribution 
Conditional average 
contribution (std) 
Sample average 
contribution (std) 
No reciprocity 497 0.48 5.09 (5.74) 2.43 (4.70) 
Reciprocity 500 0.56 4.56 (6.97) 2.56 (5.69) 
Anonymous 495 0.51 4.36 (4.79) 2.21 (4.05) 
Non-anonymous 502 0.53 5.21 (7.65) 2.77 (6.15) 
No Reference 250 0.47 6.00 (10.49) 2.84 (7.79) 
Reference: $2 249 0.61 3.61 (3.99) 2.20 (3.58) 
Reference: $5 249 0.50 3.95 (2.84) 1.98 (2.82) 
Reference: $10 249 0.49 5.97 (6.06) 2.95 (5.20) 
Total 997 0.52 4.80 (6.43) 2.49 (5.22) 
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Figure 1. Distribution of contributions for reference contribution treatments. The 
rightmost bar is contributions larger than 10 USD. 
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Table 3. Regression analysis of contributions to the national park. The coefficients reflect marginal effects evaluated at sample means. All 
models include an intercept, solicitor dummy variables and subject characteristics variables. P-values in parentheses. 
 
 2-stage robust regression 
(main effects) 
2-stage robust regression 
(with interaction effects for 
 anonymity and reciprocity) 
 Probit 
P(Contrib. >0) 
Robust regression 
of conditional 
contribution 
Total 
effect 
Probit 
P(Contrib. >0) 
Robust regression 
of conditional 
contribution 
Total 
effect 
Robust 
regression of 
conditional 
contribution 
(main 
effects) 
Robust 
regression of 
conditional 
contribution  
(interaction 
effects) 
Non-anonymous 
treatment 
0.023 
(0.480) 
0.232 
(0.356) 
0.230 
(0.256) 
0.018 
(0.687) 
-0.127 
(0.736) 
0.022 
(0.940) 
0.281 
(0.238) 
0.013 
(0.970) 
Reciprocity treatment 0.100 
(0.003) 
-0.484 
(0.070) 
0.228 
(0.283)    
-0.496 
(0.050)  
Reciprocity treatment ×  
Anonymous treatment  
   0.005 
(0.935) 
0.658 
(0.201) 
0.367 
(0.369)  
0.474 
(0.326) 
×Reciprocity treatment  
Non-anonym. treatment 
   0.089 
(0.057) 
-0.810 
(0.036) 
0.007 
(0.982)  
-0.726 
(0.045) 
Treatment with $2 
reference contribution 
0.152 
(0.001) 
-1.123 
(0.002) 
0.147 
(0.600) 
0.148 
(0.001) 
-1.154 
(0.001) 
0.110 
(0.697) 
-1.174 
(0.009) 
-1.186 
(0.009) 
Treatment with $5 
reference contribution 
0.049 
(0.280) 
0.035 
(0.924) 
0.254 
(0.384) 
0.046 
(0.314) 
-0.006 
(0.986) 
0.216 
(0.461) 
-0.116 
(0.810) 
-0.137 
(0.780) 
Treatment with $10 
reference contribution 
0.028 
(0.539) 
0.711 
(0.055) 
0.503 
(0.083) 
0.018 
(0.687) 
0.664 
(0.078) 
0.458 
(0.118) 
-0.566 
(0.258) 
-0.604 
(0.234) 
Made contribution in 
dollars only 
   
  
 0.578 
(0.249) 
0.557 
(0.271) 
Contribution in dollar ×  
$2 reference contribution 
   
  
 0.049 
(0.941) 
0.056 
(0.933) 
×Contribution in dollar  
$5 reference contribution 
    
  
0.205 
(0.769) 
0.233 
(0.740) 
×Contribution in dollar  
$10 reference 
contribution 
    
  
2.379 
(0.001) 
2.399 
(0.001) 
Solicitor dummy 
variables 
Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Subject characteristics 
variables 
Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
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